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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
The Family Research Council is a 501(c)3 nonprofit public-policy
organization headquartered in Washington, D.C., that exists to develop and analyze
governmental policies that affect families in the United States. Founded in 1983,
FRC advocates legislative and regulatory enactments that protect and strengthen
family rights and autonomy, and assists in legal challenges of statutes and
administrative actions detrimental to family interests. FRC informs and represents
the interests of 39 state organizations and over 500,000 citizens on a daily basis.
Various provisions of Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) are
contrary to family values and family interests. They impair the ability of families
to make medical decisions in consultation with healthcare providers, imposing
mandates upon individuals limiting healthcare choices, upon employers that reduce
the options they can extend to employees, upon insurers that will increase the costs
of premiums and thereby make insurance less affordable. These interests are thus
central to FRC’s organizational mission, and will only be fully addressed by ACA
being held unconstitutional in its entirety.

1

Amicus curiae certifies that all parties have consented to the filing of this brief,
that no party or counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no
person other than amicus curiae contributed any money intended to fund this
brief’s preparation or submission.
1
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce includes the

power to compel individuals to enter into commerce so that the federal government
may regulate them.
2.

Whether it is coercive for Congress to condition all existing federal

Medicaid funding—billions of dollars representing approximately 40% of all
federal funding to the States—on the States’ acceptance of new expansions to the
Medicaid program.
3.

Whether the unconstitutional provisions are nonseverable from the

remainder of the Act given their close relationship and the Government’s repeated
insistence that the Individual Mandate is necessary for the Act’s other insurance
reforms.
4.

Whether all or only some of the Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the

Individual Mandate.

2
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Severability doctrine usually enables a court to excise an unconstitutional
provision from a statute while preserving the remainder. In other situations, it
requires invalidation of much or all of the statute.
Under the “Individual Mandate” of Section 1501 of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (ACA), most Americans must purchase federallyapproved health insurance beginning in 2014. Appellee States and National
Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) argue both that this provision is
unconstitutional, and that it cannot be severed from the remainder of ACA.
Severability presents two alternatives regarding a statute’s nature. One is
that Congress intended a statute as a bundle of separate legislative embodiments,
which are bundled together in a single enactment like a series of shorter, standalone laws. The second is that a statute embodies a carefully-balanced legislative
deal, which Congress negotiated to address competing policy priorities, any
modification of which could result in the bill failing. ACA falls into the latter
category.
The Supreme Court’s most recent restatement of severability doctrine in
2010 reaffirms that the relevant part of a severability analysis examines
congressional intent. A court must determine whether the “legislative bargain”
embodied in the statute can still be fulfilled without the invalid provision. Given

3
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the admitted purposes of ACA, the statute’s main purpose cannot be achieved
without the Individual Mandate.
The Supreme Court expounded three principles underlying severability in
2006. The second of these is that is that a court cannot reformulate a statute in
order to save it. The third is that a court cannot circumvent legislative intent by
severing a provision Congress regards as central to the statute. Both of these
principles would be violated without the Individual Mandate.
The text of ACA also requires holding the Individual Mandate nonseverable.
Congress declared in the statute’s text that Section 1501 is essential to ACA
functioning as intended. Under the canon against surplusage, this Court must give
effect to Congress’s words in the statute.
Alternatively, if this Court declines to invalidate ACA in its entirety, at
minimum there are various provisions that must be invalidated with the Individual
Mandate. These include the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions, the
Medicaid expansion, and the Employer Mandate, among others. Each of these is
inextricably linked to the Individual Mandate, and stand or fall with Section 1501.

4
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ARGUMENT
Severability doctrine is comprised of the rules by which a court can
invalidate one provision of a statute while preserving the remainder intact. Under
most circumstances, severability enables a court to surgically excise an
unconstitutional provision from a statute without doing violence to the remainder.
In other situations, it requires invalidation of much—or all—of the statute at bar.
After 2013 most Americans must purchase health insurance under Section
1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119, 243 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010)
(collectively “ACA” or “the Act”). The purpose of the Act is to achieve “nearuniversal” healthcare coverage. ACA § 1501(a)(1)(D). Appellees (twenty-six
States, the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), and private
individuals) argue that Section 1501 (the “Individual Mandate”) both is
unconstitutional and cannot be severed from the remainder of the Act, such that
invalidating the Individual Mandate and accompanying statutory penalty require
this Court to invalidate ACA in whole or in substantial part.
The question in this case is not whether any of the provisions in ACA can be
severed; instead the question is whether the specific provisions challenged in this
case can be severed, especially Section 1501. All Appellees also argue that various

5
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other provisions of ACA are either unconstitutional or nonseverable from the
Individual Mandate, and Appellee States further argue that the Medicaid
expansions of the Act are unconstitutional and nonseverable from the Act. For the
following reasons, holding the Individual Mandate unconstitutional requires this
Court to invalidate the Act in its entirety, or alternatively at minimum certain other
sections of the Act in particular.
I. MODERN SEVERABILITY
CONGRESS’S INTENT.

DOCTRINE IS A TWO-STEP INQUIRY EXAMINING

Severability doctrine is a doctrine of judicial restraint under which a court
can often invalidate one provision of a statute while preserving the remainder
intact. “The unconstitutionality of a part of an Act does not necessarily defeat or
affect the validity of its remaining provisions.” Champlin Refining Co. v.
Corporation Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932). In some—but not all—
circumstances, it enables a court to surgically excise an unconstitutional provision
from a statute without doing violence to the remainder of the Act. “If an
unconstitutional [provision] of a statutory scheme is severable . . . we will not
invalidate the entire scheme.” United States v. Romero-Fernandez, 983 F.2d 195,
196 (11th Cir. 1993).
As Amicus FRC argued in the district court and the district court agreed, the
question of severability is a judicial inquiry of two alternatives regarding the nature
of a statute. One possibility is that Congress intended a given statute as a bundle of
6
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separate legislative embodiments, which for the sake of convenience, avoiding
redundancy, and contextual application, are bundled together in a single legislative
enactment. This effectively makes a statute a series of short laws, every one of
which is designed to stand alone, if needs be. The second possibility is that a given
statute embodies a carefully-balanced legislative bargain, in which Congress
weighs competing policy priorities, and through negotiations and deliberation
crafts a package codifying this delicate balance. Congress is thus not voting for
separate and discrete provisions. Instead, Congress is voting on a package as a
whole, any modification of which could result in the bill failing to achieve passage
in Congress. The instant appeal falls into the latter category, not the former.
A. Free Enter. Fund restated severability as a two-step inquiry focused
on congressional intent in codifying a “legislative bargain.”
The Supreme Court recently restated severability doctrine in Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). In Free Enter.
Fund, the Court held that severability is a two-step inquiry. First, the remainder of
the statute must continue to be “fully operative as a law” absent the invalid
provisions. Id. at 3161 (citations omitted). If the remainder would be fully
operative, the second step is to uphold the truncated statute “unless it is evident
that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions … independently of
that which is invalid.” Id. (citation omitted).

7
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The parties rightly agree that ACA would not become incomprehensible
absent Section 1501. Therefore the instant appeal turns on the second prong of
severability, ascertaining congressional intent. The Supreme Court’s recent
restatement of this intent inquiry reiterated what has been a consistent rule for 135
years. Compare id. at 3161−62 with Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678,
685−86 (1987); Champlin, 286 U.S. at 234; United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214,
221 (1876). “Unless it is evident that the legislature would not have enacted those
provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the
invalid part may be dropped if what is left if fully operative as a law.” Champlin,
286 U.S. at 234 (citing various cases).
These cases stand for the proposition that a statute can only function in the
manner Congress intended if it fulfills the overall purpose for which the statute was
passed. Consequently, the rule is that an invalid provision is nonseverable if it is
essential to the clear purpose of the statutory scheme, since Congress would not
have passed the remaining statute if it fails to achieve Congress’s overall objective.
That is to say, Congress would not vote to enact a legislative package that does not
achieve the core of the “legislative bargain.”
In Alaska Airlines the Court held that legislative intent turns on whether the
overall statutory scheme created by the challenged statute can function in the
manner Congress intended when initially enacting the legislation:

8
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The more relevant inquiry in evaluating severability is whether the
statute will function in a manner consistent with the intent of
Congress. . . The final test . . . is the traditional one: the
unconstitutional provision must be severed unless the statute created
in its absence is legislation that Congress would not have enacted.
480 U.S. at 685. Thus, this Court’s “inquiry boils down to the likely legislative
intent,” Ala. Power Co. v. United States Doe, 307 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir.
2002), in terms of whether ACA can function in the manner Congress desires
without the effect of the Individual Mandate on ACA’s overall statutory scheme.
B. This appeal turns on whether the “legislative bargain” intended by
Congress can be achieved if Section 1501 is invalid.
Although various aspects of severability doctrine have changed throughout
our Nation’s history, the aspect involving legislative intent has remained consistent
throughout. “Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those
provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the
invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.” Alaska
Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976)
(quoting in turn Champlin, 286 U.S. at 234)). In addition, Alaska Airlines made
clear that even without a severability clause statutes are presumed severable,
though that presumption is weaker absent an express clause. See id. at 686. And in
all cases, a judicial inquiry into congressional intent must determine whether the
truncated statute still achieves Congress’s purpose in crafting “the original
legislative bargain.” Id. at 685.
9
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The Government attempts to shield the remainder of ACA from Section
1501’s invalidity with one Supreme Court footnote, which states the “ultimate
determination of severability will rarely turn on the presence or absence of such a
[severance] clause.” U.S. Br. at 58 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
570, 585 n.27 (1968)). But that citation is inapposite; all parties here agree that
statutes are usually severable. Moreover, as already shown, the touchstone is
congressional intent regarding the overall significance of the invalid provision. As
such, the presence of a clause is rarely pivotal to a severability inquiry, and never
dispositive. This Jackson citation thus gives the misleading impression that the
absence of a clause is of no moment. But the entirety of the Supreme Court’s
severability doctrine proves that Jackson’s isolated footnote stands for no such
proposition. Indeed, even in Jackson, the Court went on to find the challenged
provision severable because it was “functionally independent” of the other
provisions, and as such it was “quite inconceivable” that Congress “would have
chosen to discard the entire statute.” Id. at 586. In so holding, the Court expressly
cited a similar question from 1894, where the Court held the invalid provision
severable because the “main purpose of the statute” would not be frustrated. Id. at
586 n.28 (quoting Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 396
(1894)). That is exactly the opposite of the instant appeal, where the main purpose
of the statute clearly would be defeated without the Individual Mandate.

10
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C. Supreme Court instruction regarding statutory purposes,
judicial doubt, and presumptions are essential to the instant
appeal.
Both the Federal Government and the States have brought to this Court’s
attention several Supreme Court severability precedents relevant to the instant
appeal. See Br. of Appellee States 59−66; Br. of Appellee NFIB 59−62; Br. of U.S.
55−60. However, there are various other principles and instructions from the Court
that are of critical importance for this Court to consider.
The citations in the parties’ briefs only provide a portion of modern
severability doctrine, as the Supreme Court has set forth in considerable detail how
this Court is to determine whether Congress’s intent is sufficiently satisfied after
invalidating a statutory provision for this Court to retain the remainder of the
statute. The Supreme Court’s holdings in those cases require this Court to hold the
Individual Mandate nonseverable from the remainder of the Act.
The Supreme Court articulates the test of congressional intent in the following
manner:
[I]n order to hold one part of a statute unconstitutional and uphold
another part as separable, they must not be mutually dependent upon
one another. Perhaps a fair approach to a solution of the problem is to
suppose that while the bill was pending in Congress a motion to strike
out the [invalid provision] had prevailed, and to inquire whether, in
that event, the statute should be so construed as to justify the
conclusion that Congress, not-withstanding, probably would not have
passed the [remainder of the statute].

11
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Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 313 (1936). While such hypothesizing is
not without difficulty, a court must nonetheless envision such a scenario in its
severability analysis.
If there is significant doubt as to whether Congress would have enacted the
statute without the invalid provision, this doubt is sufficient to require this Court to
invalidate the entire Act. This Court must “inquire whether it is plain that Congress
would have enacted the legislation had the act been limited to” its effect without
the invalid provision. “If we are satisfied that it would not, or that the matter is in
such doubt that we are unable to say what Congress would have done omitting the
unconstitutional feature, then the statute must fall.” El Paso & Ne. Ry. v. Gutierrez,
215 U.S. 87, 97 (1909) (emphases added). It need not be clearly evident that the
truncated statute would not have been enacted. If the invalid provision is important
enough to the overall enactment to cause considerable doubt, a court is to err on
the side of caution by invalidating the entire statute and returning the issue to
Congress for reconsideration.
Furthermore, a court must determine whether Congress’s policy goals can be
effectively achieved without the unconstitutional provision to retain the remainder
of a statute. In holding an invalid provision severable, a plurality of the Court in
Regan v. Time found that the “policies Congress sought to advance” would still be

12
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effectuated by the remaining statute, thus achieving “the main purposes” of the
statute. 468 U.S. 641, 653−55 (1984) (plurality opinion).
Such a holding is consistent with judicially determining “whether the
unconstitutional provisions are so connected with the general scope of the law as to
make it impossible, if they are stricken out, to give effect to what appears to have
been the intent of the legislature.” Allen v. City of Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 84
(1881). The Court set forth how to construe this test, adopting at length by quoting
in Allen the reasoning of an 1854 Massachusetts state case:
Such an act has all the forms of law, and has been passed and
sanctioned by the duly constituted legislative department of the
government; and if any part is unconstitutional, it is because it is not
within the scope of legitimate legislative authority to pass it. Yet other
parts of the same act may not be obnoxious to the same objection, and
therefore have the full force of law, in the same manner as if these
several enactments had been made by different statutes. But this must
be taken with this limitation, that the parts, so held respectively
constitutional and unconstitutional, must be wholly independent of
each other. But if they are so mutually connected with and dependent
on each other . . . as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended
them as a whole, and that, if all could not carried into effect, the
legislature would not pass the residue independently, and some parts
are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent,
conditional or connected, must fall with them.
Warren v. Charlestown, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84, 98−99 (1854) (emphases added).
Referring to these severability principles as “well settled” by 1902, the
Supreme Court elaborated upon the rule concerning legislative intent that:
If different sections of a statute are independent of each other, that
which is unconstitutional may be disregarded, and valid sections may
13
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stand and be enforced. But if an obnoxious provision is of such import
that the other sections without it would cause results not contemplated
or desired by the legislature, then the entire statute must be held
inoperative.
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 565 (1902). Allen and
subsequent cases have been reaffirmed in recent case law, confirming that the
modern severability rule concerning congressional intent has been consistently
applied for more than a century. See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New
England, 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S.
491, 502 (1985).
The presumption of severability—a presumption that as explained in Part III
is considerably diminished if Congress elects not to include a severability clause—
can be overcome if the remaining statute does not fulfill Congress’s purpose in
enacting the statute:
[T]his presumption must be overcome by considerations that make
evident the inseparability of the provisions or the clear probability that
the legislature would not have been satisfied with the statute unless it
had included the invalid part.
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165, 185 (1932) (internal citations
omitted). “The presumption in favor of separability does not authorize the court to
give the statute ‘an effect altogether different from that sought by the measure
viewed as a whole.’” Carter, 298 U.S. at 313 (quoting R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Alton
R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 362 (1935)).
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For the reasons set forth in the States’ and NFIB’s briefs, there is not a clear
probability that Congress would have been “satisfied” that ACA would achieve its
“main purposes” without Section 1501. The “original legislative bargain” codified
in the Act cannot be realized without the effect of millions of people purchasing
insurance pursuant to the Individual Mandate. Therefore Section 1501 cannot be
severed from ACA.
II. THIS INQUIRY INCORPORATES THREE PRINCIPLES UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED BY
THE SUPREME COURT IN THE 2006 AYOTTE CASE.
The Supreme Court has clarified and elaborated upon severability doctrine
since Alaska Airlines, which serves to confirm the argument of the States and
NFIB. The Court in 2006 expounded three principles that this Court must apply in
conducting a severability examination in a unanimous opinion written by Justice
O’Connor. The Court in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England was
considering a New Hampshire statute involving parental notification before a
minor could obtain an abortion, a statute which the Court noted contained an
express severability clause. 546 U.S. at 323−24, 331. This unanimous opinion
revolved around severability, in which the Court declared three principles that
form the rationale underlying severability doctrine:
Three interrelated principles inform our approach to remedies. First,
we try not to nullify more of a legislature’s work than is necessary . . .
. Second, mindful that our constitutional mandate and institutional
competence are limited, we restrain ourselves from rewriting [a] law
to conform it to constitutional requirements even as we try to salvage
15
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it. . . . Third, the touchstone for any decision about remedy is
legislative intent, for a court cannot use its remedial powers to
circumvent the intent of the legislature.
Id. at 329−30 (brackets and citations omitted). These principles were referenced
and applied by the Court in 2010 in Free Enterprise Fund. See 130 S. Ct. at
3161−62. While the first principle is uncontested by the parties here, the second
two are pivotal in the instant case.
The Supreme Court elaborated on the second principle in Ayotte thus:
Second, mindful that our constitutional mandate and institutional
competence are limited, we restrain ourselves from “rewrit[ing] [a]
law to conform it to constitutional requirements” even as we try to
salvage it. Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383,
397 (1988). Our ability to devise a judicial remedy that does not entail
quintessentially legislative work often depends on how clearly we
have already articulated the background constitutional rules at issue . .
. But making distinctions in a murky constitutional context, or where
line-drawing is inherently complex, may call for a “far more serious
invasion of the legislative domain” than we ought to undertake.
[United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U.S. 454, 479 n.26
(1995)].
Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329−30. Thus, the Court reasoned that surgical exercises to
cleanly remove an unconstitutional provision is one thing, but having to rebalance
a statutory scheme becomes a “far more serious invasion,” and is impermissible.
This too is consistent with over a century of Supreme Court precedent. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that courts cannot sever valid provisions
from invalid ones when doing so would reformulate the legislation’s central
effects. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 98 (1879). “So here, to give the
16
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sections in question the effect suggested it would be necessary to reject”
Congress’s intent for this statute. “To do this would be to introduce a limitation
where Congress intended none and thereby to make a new . . . statute, which, of
course, [courts] may not do.” Butts v. Merchants & Miners Transp. Co., 230 U.S.
126, 135 (1913).
This relates to the third principle in Ayotte, which the Court expounded as
follows:
Third, the touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative
intent, for a court cannot “use its remedial powers to circumvent the
intent of the legislature.” After finding an application or portion of a
statute unconstitutional, we must next ask: Would the legislature have
preferred what is left of its statute to no statute at all? All the while,
we are wary of legislatures who would rely on our intervention, for
“[i]t would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net
large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts
to step inside” to announce to whom the statute may be applied. “This
would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative
department of the government.”
Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330 (citing, inter alia, Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684; Reese,
92 U.S. at 221) (other internal citations omitted); accord INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 931−32 (1983).
In Carter the Supreme Court held regarding several presumably valid
statutory provisions that they:
are so related to and dependent upon the [invalid] provisions … as to
make it clearly probable that the latter being held bad, the former
would not have been passed. The fall of the latter, therefore, carries
down with it the former.
17

Case: 11-11021

Date Filed: 05/11/2011

Page: 26 of 40

298 U.S. 238, 316 (1936) (citing Int’l Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 113
(1910); Warren, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) at 98−99).
The Court has stated in a recent severability case that “where Congress has
enacted a statutory scheme for an obvious purpose, and where Congress has
included a series of provisions operating as incentives to achieve that purpose, the
invalidation of one of the incentives should not ordinarily cause Congress’ overall
intent to be frustrated.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186 (1992). The
Court in New York suggested severability is more likely when the invalid provision
is merely an aid to the “main purpose” of a statute, id. at 186−87, suggesting that
where excising the offensive provision would undermine the statute’s manifest
purpose, this factor counsels against severability. Applying Alaska Airlines, in
severing the unconstitutional provision which was unshielded by a severability
clause, the New York Court held that the invalid provision could be severed both
because the remainder of the statute “is still operative and it still serves Congress’
objective . . . .” Id. at 187. Post-Alaska Airlines, courts place even greater emphasis
on considering the purpose of the statutory scheme in assessing whether a given
provision is separable. The Court reinforced this aspect of its holding by
concluding, “The purpose of the Act is not defeated by the invalidation of the
[faulty provision], so we may leave the remainder of the Act in force.” Id.
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These latter two principles from Ayotte are of central importance in the
instant appeal. This Court is required to consult this case’s entire record on appeal.
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984). As Appellee NFIB sets
forth for this Court in its brief, the Government conceded on the record below that
various other provisions of ACA “cannot survive if the minimum coverage
provision is stricken.” R.E. 1765. This is because the Individual Mandate and
accompanying statutory penalty for noncompliance constitute the “linchpin” of the
entire statutory scheme embodied in ACA.
It is clear from the States’ and NFIB’s briefs that ACA would be
reformulated into a de facto different statute without Section 1501. It is manifestly
clear that Congress’s intent was not to enact a statute that did not achieve nearuniversal coverage, and without the Individual Mandate millions of individuals
would remain uninsured and there would not be sufficient cash flowing into the
insurance market to compensate for the various other provisions that will draw
cash out of the insurance market. Applying the principles unanimously affirmed by
the Supreme Court in Ayotte, it is clear that the Individual Mandate is nonseverable
from the statute in whole and in part, requiring this Court to invalidate ACA in
whole or in substantial part if this Court holds Section 1501 unconstitutional.
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THE TEXT OF ACA REQUIRES HOLDING SECTION 1501 NONSEVERABLE.
The lack of a severability clause weakens the presumption of severability.

However, this case goes beyond normal presumptions, as ACA’s text contains an
expression of Congress’s intent that Section 1501 is essential to ACA functioning
in the manner Congress intended. This Court must give effect to these words in the
statute, and therefore in invalidating the Individual Mandate this Court must strike
down the Act in toto.
A. The lack of a severability clause weakens the presumption of
severability.
Statues with a severability clause are presumed severable. Alaska Airlines,
480 U.S. at 686. This is because when a severability clause is included:
when validity is in question, divisibility and not integration is the
guiding principle. Invalid parts are to be excised and the remainder
enforced. When we are seeking to ascertain the congressional
purpose, we must give heed to this explicit declaration.
Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm’n, 303 U.S. 419, 434
(1938).
While the lack of a severability clause is not automatically fatal to an entire
statute, it carries a significant effect. It is usually an “elusive inquiry” to determine
congressional intent on severability without a severability clause. Chadha, 462
U.S. at 932. This is because a severability clause:
furnishes assurances to courts that they may properly sustain separate
sections or provisions of a partly invalid act with out [sic] hesitation
20
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or doubt as to whether they would have been adopted, even if the
legislature had been advised of the invalidity of part. But it does not
give the court power to amend the act.
Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 41, 77 (1922).
Critically, the reason ascertaining intent is usually difficult is not
problematic in the instant appeal. The Court explains:
The inquiry is eased when Congress has explicitly provided for
severance by including a severability clause in the statute. This Court
has held that the inclusion of such a clause creates a presumption that
Congress did not intend the validity of the statute in question to
depend on the validity of the constitutionally offensive provision. In
such a case, unless there is strong evidence that Congress intended
otherwise, the objectionable provision can be excised from the
remainder of the statute. In the absence of a severability clause,
however, Congress’ silence is just that—silence—and does not raise a
presumption against severability.
Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686 (internal citations omitted). “Drawing meaning
from silence is particularly inappropriate” when “Congress has shown that it
knows how to [declare its intent] in express terms.” Kimbrough v. United States,
552 U.S. 85, 103 (2007). But Congress and the Federal Government are anything
but silent regarding the importance of the Individual Mandate to ACA functioning
as Congress intended.
B. Congress’s declaration that Section 1501 is essential to ACA
achieving Congress’ purpose is an expression of congressional intent.
Congress is not silent on whether Section 1501 can be severed; Congress
indicates in the very text of the statute that Section 1501 is nonseverable. Many
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other provisions of the Act would doubtless be severable from the whole if those
provisions were held unconstitutional. But those provisions are not at issue in the
case at bar. Instead, Congress explicitly found regarding the Individual Mandate:
[I]f there were no requirement, many individuals would wait to
purchase health insurance until they needed care. By significantly
increasing health insurance coverage, the requirement, together with
the other provisions of this Act, will minimize this adverse selection
and broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy
individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums. The
requirement is essential to creating effective health insurance markets
in which improved health insurance products that are guaranteed issue
and do not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold.
Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 1501 (a)(2)(G), 124 Stat. 119, 243 (2010) (emphasis added).
Congress then reiterated this finding a second time in amendments. Id. § 10106
(a)(2)(I), 124 Stat. 908 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I)).
Even without this finding, the removal of a severability clause from an
earlier version of ACA—a fact the Government concedes, see U.S. Br. at 59
n.10—is itself significant. As NFIB quotes from the Ninth Circuit, see NFIB Br. at
61, while removing the clause is not dispositive, “it does suggest that Congress
intended to have the various components of the [healthcare] package operate
together or not at all.” Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.3d 1245, 1267 (9th Cir.
1988). The Ninth Circuit has recently reaffirmed that same principle, holding:
When Congress deliberately makes a decision to omit a particular
provision from a statute—a decision that it is aware may well result in
the statute’s wholesale invalidation . . . we would not be faithful to its
legislative intent were we to devise a remedy that in effect inserts the
22
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provision into the statute contrary to its wishes. Such an action would
be inconsistent with our proper judicial role.
Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1187 (9th Cir.
2006), rev’d sub nom. on other grounds Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
The removal of the severability clause from the entire legislation, conjoined
with Congress expressly finding the Individual Mandate particularly essential to
the statute, leads to the conclusion that while perhaps other sections of ACA might
be severable, Section 1501 is definitely nonseverable.
C. The canon against surplusage requires this Court to give effect to
Congress’s finding of the Individual Mandate’s necessity.
Under the canon against surplusage, this Court is required to give some legal
effect to this declaration of congressional intent. The only plausible reading of
Congress declaring the Individual Mandate “essential to creating effective health
insurance markets”—which is manifestly the “main purpose” of ACA’s statutory
scheme—is to hold the Individual Mandate nonseverable from the Act.
In the formative years of judicial power, the Supreme Court stated that
regarding a legal text, it “cannot be presumed that any clause . . . is intended to be
without effect . . . unless the words require it.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 175 (1803) (dictum). Although the dictum in Marbury specifically
referenced the Constitution, that canon against surplusage has long since been
elevated to a holding regarding not only the Constitution, but also statutes. See,
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e.g., Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 153 (2008); Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S.
88, 101 (2004). Simply put, if a provision is found within the four corners of the
statute’s text, then any court must assign a legal effect to that provision unless
there is some compelling reason not to do so.
While the Court set aside Congress’s findings in United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000)—a case heavily implicated in the Commerce Clause aspect of
the instant appeal—the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Morrison is inapposite here.
In the statute at issue in Morrison, Congress had made congressional findings
pertaining to the impact on interstate commerce of the violence at issue in that
statute. See id. at 610−14. However, the Court in Morrison set aside those findings
as factual matters that would result in the Commerce Clause being eviscerated of
any meaningful way to constrain federal power by casting too broad a net under
the auspices of the Commerce Clause. See id. at 612−17.
Here, by contrast, in a severability inquiry this Court is not examining
findings of fact, and is instead looking for indicia of Congress’s intent. Whether
Congress’s finding that the Individual Mandate as a factual matter is truly essential
to comprehensive reform of the health insurance market is irrelevant to the selfevident fact that by making such a declaration, Congress believed the Individual
Mandate essential. Therefore Congress intended Section 1501 to be nonseverable
because Congress would not have voted to enact ACA without the Individual
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Mandate if Congress believed Section 1501 necessary to ACA functioning in the
manner Congress intended.
IV. THIS COURT MUST AT MINIMUM HOLD SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF ACA
NONSEVERABLE FROM SECTION 1501.
Although for all the reasons set forth in Parts I, II, & III, this Court should
invalidate ACA in its entirety, in the alternative there are a number of provisions
that must at minimum stand or fall with the Individual Mandate. The Supreme
Court has occasionally found statutes partially severable. E.g., Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 83 (1976); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 108−09;
Alton, 295 U.S. at 361.
“It is an elementary principle that the same statute may be in part
constitutional and in part unconstitutional, and that if the parts are wholly
independent of each other, that which is constitutional may stand while that which
is unconstitutional will be rejected.” Allen, 103 U.S. at 83−84 (emphases added). If
this Court rightly holds the Individual Mandate unconstitutional, but declines to
invalidate ACA in toto, this Court must then determine whether various provisions
are not wholly independent of Section 1501, in which case those provisions must
fall along with the Individual Mandate.
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A. ACA’s text requires, and the Government concedes, that Sections
1001 and 1201 cannot be severed from Section 1501.
First, as shown above, ACA’s text declares that the Individual Mandate is
essential the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions of the Act. Those
provisions in ACA §§ 1001, 1201, disallow excluding people with preexisting
conditions and require insurance premiums to reflect aggregate health conditions
as opposed to the health risk factors of individuals. The government has conceded
that these provisions stand or fall with Section 1501. R.E. 1765. The district court
considered all this in stating that these provisions are inextricably linked. R.E.
2069, 2074. Taking these factors together, there is no basis in judicial precedent
whatsoever for this Court to hold that Section 1501 can be severed from ACA §§
1001, 1201.
B. Moreover, ACA’s Medicaid expansion cannot be severed from
Section 1501.
In addition, the Medicaid expansion cannot be severed from the Individual
Mandate because they work together to achieve the same purpose. The goal of the
statute, as previously noted, is to achieve “near-universal” coverage. The
Individual Mandate is intended to do this by forcing those who allegedly have the
means to currently afford health insurance to purchase it. The Act also vastly
expands Medicaid, ACA § 2001, and low-income subsidies, §§ 1401, 1402. This
expansion is to provide coverage for individuals who cannot afford to comply with
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the Individual Mandate. The States correctly argue on cross-appeal that this
expansion is an unconstitutional coercion of the States by exceeding Congress’s
power under the Spending Clause. That aside, this Medicaid expansion is
inextricably linked to the Individual Mandate as they operate in tandem to fulfill
Congress’s purpose for the Act.
The purpose of partial invalidation is “to allow the statute to operate in a
manner consistent with congressional intent.” United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 227 (2005). Without both the Individual Mandate and the Medicaid
expansion, the Act cannot “function in a manner consistent with the intent of
Congress.” Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685. Therefore if this Court invalidates
Section 1501, this Court must also invalidate the Medicaid expansion.
C. Various additional sections cannot be severed from Section 1501.
There are various other provisions of ACA that also cannot be severed from
the Individual Mandate.
Above all remaining sections of the Act, this Court cannot separate the
Individual Mandate from the “Employer Mandate” requiring all employers with 50
or more employees to provide federally approved forms of healthcare insurance,
and subjecting non-complying employers to a draconian per-employee penalty.
ACA § 1513. The Employer Mandate is nonseverable for the same reasons that the
Medicaid expansion cannot be severed. It is the third of three major ACA
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components to achieve near-universal healthcare coverage, by seeking to ensure
that every person employed by a large organization has access to healthcare.
Coupled with the Individual Mandate compelling individuals that may be selfemployed or employed with a small or mid-sized employer to purchase insurance,
and the Medicaid expansion covering low-income and unemployed persons, the
Employer Mandate is how Congress would achieve its purchase.
Likewise, the CLASS Act cannot be severed from the Individual Mandate.
This title creates a healthcare system for community living. See ACA tit. VIII, §
8001. Although not on the scale of ACA §§ 1001, 1201, 1501, 1513, 2001,
nonetheless ACA § 8001 creates a system targeting a particular segment of the
American population for health insurance to achieve near-universal coverage,
providing that population with various benefits. It is designed to act in tandem with
millions of newly-insured, mostly-healthy individuals as a result of the Individual
Mandate, specifically taking advantage of the billions of dollars injected into the
national health-insurance pool as a result of Section 1501. Without the Individual
Mandate, Section 8001 must fall.
D. Beyond these, Congress’s clear purpose for ACA would be frustrated
unless all ACA provisions burdening the insurance industry are held
nonseverable from Section 1501.
As this list demonstrates, there are many provisions of the Act that become
unworkable without the Individual Mandate. For example, other provisions that are
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particularly linked to the financial impact of the Individual Mandate, and thus
should fall with Section 1501, include ACA § 9001 (limiting financial health
savings account benefits); § 9003 (restricting obtaining over-the-counter
medications); § 9010 (health insurance industry fees); § 9015 (Medicare taxes).
These provisions share a common denominator. Along with ACA §§ 1001,
1201, 1501, 1513, 8001, these provisions all have a cash-flow impact on the
healthcare insurance industry. They are part of the equation for achieving nearuniversal coverage.
There are many other such provisions in ACA. The Act contains
approximately 450 sections. R.E. 2074. Section 1501 is the “linchpin” of the
statute because it ensures the cash flow into the insurance market necessary to
offset the resulting costs. Congress would therefore not have introduced the
provisions depleting the market of funds without the primary revenue measure to
bring funds into that market. Thus if this Court invalidates Section 1501 but
declines to invalidate ACA entirely, this Court should instead invalidate all the
provisions of the Act that impact the cost of healthcare premiums, in addition to
the provisions enumerated above.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the judgment of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Florida in part, in invalidating Section
1501 and holding Section 1501 nonseverable, thus invalidating the Act in its
entirety.
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